Authenticating HTTPS clients using TLS certificates has long been very easy to do. The hardest part, in fact, is to create a PKI infrastructure robust enough so that compromised (or otherwise no longer desirable) certificates cannot be used anymore. While setting that up can be fairly involved, it's all pretty standard practice these days.
But authentication using a private CA is laughably easy. With apache, you just do something like:
SSLCACertificateFile /path/to/ca-certificate.pem SSLVerifyClient require
...and you're done. With the above two lines, apache will send a CertificateRequest message to the client, prompting the client to search its local certificate store for certificates signed by the CA(s) in the ca-certificate.pem file, and using the certificate thus found to authenticate against the server.
This works perfectly fine for setting up authentication for a handful of users. It will even work fine for a few thousands of users. But what if you're trying to set up website certificate authentication for millions of users? Well, in that case, storing everything in a single CA just doesn't work, and you'll need intermediate CAs to make things not fall flat on their face.
Unfortunately, the standard does not state what should happen when a client certificate is signed by an intermediate certificate, and the distinguished name(s) in the CertificateRequest message are those of the certificate(s) at the top of the chain rather than the intermediates. Previously, browsers would not just send out the client certificate, but also send along the certificate that it knew to have signed that client certificate, and so on until it found a self-signed certificate. With that, the server would see a chain of certificates that it could verify against the root certificates in its local trust store, and certificate verification would succeed.
It would appear that browsers are currently changing this behaviour, however. With the switch to BoringSSL, Google Chrome on the GNU/Linux platform no longer sent the signing certificates, and instead only sends the leaf certificate that it wants to use for certificate authentication. In the bug report, Ryan Sleevi explains that while the change was premature, the long term plans are for this to be the behaviour not just on GNU/Linux, but on Windows and macOS too. Meanwhile, the issue has been resolved for Chrome 54 (due to be released), but there's no saying for how long. As if that was not enough, the new version of Safari as shipped with macOS 10.12 has also stopped sending intermediate certificates, and expects the web server to be happy with just receiving the leaf certificates.
So, I guess it's safe to say that when you want to authenticate a client
in a multi-level hierarchical CA environment, you cannot just hand the
webserver a list of root certificates and expect things to work anymore;
you'll have to hand it the intermediary certificates as well. To do so,
you need to modify the
SSLCACertificateFile parameter in apache
configuration so that it not only contains the root certificate, but all
the intermediate certificates as well. If your list of intermediate
certificates is rather long, it may
improve performance to use
SSLCACertificatePath and the
tool to create a hashed directory with certificates rather than a PEM
file, but in essense, that should work.
While this works, the problem with doing so is that now the DNs of all the intermediate certificates are sent along with the CertificateRequest message to the client, which (again, if your list of intermediate certificates is rather long) may result in performance issues. The fix for that is fairly easy: add a line like
where the file
root-certificates.pem contains the root certificates
only. This file will tell the webserver which certificates should be
announced in the CertificateRequest message, but the
SSLCACertificatePath) configuration item
will still be used for actual verification of the certificates in
question. Note though that the root certificates apparently also seem to
need to be available in the
SSLCACertificateFile configuration; if you do not do so, then
authentication seems to fail, although I haven't yet found why.
I've set up a test page for all of those "millions" of certificates, and it seems to work for me. I've you're trying to use one of those millions of certificates against your own webserver or have a similar situation with a different set of certificates, you might want to make the above changes, too.